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Recent years have witnessed an increasing number of union mergers.'
International labor organizations2 are consolidating their local affiliates
with greater frequency and independent locals are actively seeking affilia-
tions with international unions.
In view of the steady decline in the percentage of union membership in
the total workforce, 3 these mergers represent an important tool for consoli-
dating bargaining power.4 Union mergers, whether resulting from the
consolidation of two or more locals of an international union or the affilia-
tion of an independent union with an international union, raise difficult
legal questions under the Labor-Management Relations (Taft-Hartley)
Act.5 Traditionally, when a union currently certified as the exclusive bar-
gaining representative of a unit of employees covered by the Taft-Hartley
Act effects a merger, the certified union has been required only to amend
its certification to reflect its changed status.6 Under the National Labor
1. In 1977, 65 amendment certification petitions were filed with the NLRB. See [1978]
97 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 284; note 6 and accompanying text infra. This figure represents
more than a 50% increase over the number (41) filed in 1976. BUREAU OF NATIONAL AF-
FAIRS, LABOR RELATIONS YEARBOOK 1977 at 306.
2. International unions such as the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, are parent
labor organizations with local affiliates in the United States and Canada.
3. See Kistler, Trends in Union Growth, 28 LAB. L.J. 539, 539-40 (1977). In 1956, ap-
proximately 42% of the nation's work force were union members. By 1974, however, the
number of unionized employees had dropped to between 32% and 36%. Kistler views this
drop as a natural consequence of increasingly intense employer opposition to union organi-
zation. Id.
4. Mergers and affiliations enable the unions to consolidate this bargaining power so
as to bring maximum economic strength to bear in the collective bargaining process. Merg-
ers, therefore, represent the ultimate in coordinated bargaining. See generally Cohen, Union
Rationale and Objectives of Coordinated Bargaining, 27 LAB. L.J. 75, 78-79 (1976).
5. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141 to 167, 171 to 197 (1976).
6. The basic criteria for amendment is as follows:
If there is a unit covered by a certification and there is no question concerning
representation, any party may file a petition for amendment [AC petition] to reflect
changed circumstances, such as changes in the name or affiliation of the labor or-
ganization involved or in the name or location of the employer involved.
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Relations Board's (NLRB) amendment certification (AC) procedure, a
union's certification will be amended if the merger has not "raised a ques-
tion concerning representation" and if the merger was approved by a ma-
jority of the members in a union-conducted election.7 Thus, the Board will
make an initial substantive inquiry: whether continuity of representation
is maintained after the merger. Then, it will make a procedural inquiry to
ascertain whether the results obtained from the approval vote reflect ma-
jority opinion. If the merged union satisfies both of these criteria, the
Board will amend the certification. 8
Recently, however, Board members as well as federal courts of appeal
have disagreed in their evaluations of both the continuity of representation
and procedural criteria. The dispute over the continuity criterion concerns
the degree of change that the bargaining agent's status may undergo before
the Board must find a lack of continuity in representation. On the other
hand, the main issue in the procedural dispute is whether the union must
allow all bargaining unit employees, rather than exclusively union mem-
bers, to vote in the merger approval election.
In Jasper Seating Co. ,9 the Board addressed both of these disputes. In
that case, a majority of the full Board denied an AC petition from an in-
dependent local that had affiliated with an international union. The three
member majority, although agreeing that the petition should be denied,
disagreed as to the rationale.' 0 Members Jenkins and Walther did not
question the continuity of representation, but dismissed the petition be-
cause the union had allowed only union members to vote in the merger
NLRB Statements of Procedure, 29 C.F.R. § 101.17 (1978).
7. See North Elec. Co., 165 N.L.R.B. 942, 942 (1967). The Board stated as a "general
rule" that amendment certifications would not be granted when "they [either] raise a ques-
tion concerning representation that can only be resolved by an election . . . [or] where the
possibility of a question concerning representation remains open because the change of affil-
iation took place under circumstances that do not indicate that the change reflected a major-
ity view." Id. at 942. See also Safway Steel Scaffolds Co., 173 N.L.R.B. 311 (1968); Emery
Indus., Inc., 148 N.L.R.B. 51 (1964).
An amendment certification petition may also be filed by a local union to reflect the
merger of its international affiliate with another international. See, e.g., NLRB v. Pearl
Bookflnding Co., 89 L.R.R.M. 2614 (1st Cir. 1975); NLRB v. Commercial Letter, Inc., 496
F.2d 35 (8th Cir. 1974); Carpinteria Lemon Ass'n v. NLRB, 240 F.2d 554 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 354 U.S. 909 (1957); Dickey v. NLRB, 217 F.2d 652 (6th Cir. 1954). This note,
however, will deal exclusively with the more commonplace mergers involving local-local
union consolidations and independent-international union affiliations.
8. See, e.g., Hamilton Tool Co., 190 N.L.R.B. 571, 573-75 (1971).
9. 231 N.L.R.B. 1025 (1977).




approval election." In their view, an essential aspect of the procedural
requirement was that all unit employees be permitted to vote. 12 Member
Penello, concurring with the denial of the AC petition, never reached the
procedural issue of non-member voting. Rather, he concluded that the
merger of a small, independent local with a large international created a
discontinuity of representation, thus raising a clear "question concerning
representation."' 3 Only Chairman Fanning and Member Murphy, es-
pousing the Board's previous reasoning, found that the union had satisfied
both criteria necessary for an amendment certification.'
4
In contrast, a unanimous three member panel composed of Chairman
Fanning and Members Jenkins and Murphy displayed a much less strin-
gent approach to the two criteria in McKesson Wine &' Spirits Co. 15 Mc-
Kesson, however, involved an AC petition filed by a local union recently
consolidated with another local of the same international union.' 6 Al-
though the merger was accomplished without an approval vote of any
kind, the panel found the procedural criterion satisfied and granted the
petition because the union had subsequently conducted a ratification vote
among all bargaining unit employees.17 Furthermore, none of the panel
members questioned the existence of continuity of representation in the
11. Id.
12. Id. Member Jenkins first expressed this view in his dissent in North Elec. Co., 165
N.L.R.B. 942 (1967)(Member Jenkins, dissenting). See also East Dayton Tool & Die Co.,
190 N.L.R.B. 577, 580 (1971); Hamilton Tool Co., 190 N.L.R.B. 571, 576 (1971)(Member
Jenkins, dissenting).
13. 231 N.L.R.B. 1026-27 (Member Penello, concurring). Member Penello adopted the
position of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit on independent-interna-
tional mergers. See United States Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 457 F.2d 660 (3d Cir. 1972). In
United States Steel, the Third Circuit concluded that representational continuity was lack-
ing in a merged independent-international union because of the change in the union mem-
bers' rights resulting from the imposition of the international's constitution on the merged
local. Id. at 664. See notes 32-38 and accompanying text infra.
14. 231 N.L.R.B. 1028-29 (Chairman Fanning and Member Murphy, dissenting).
Chairman Fanning and Member Murphy found the procedural criterion satisfied because
they viewed the approval election as an internal union matter not requiring non-member
participation. Id. Additionally, they found continuity of representation because the merger
had involved no change in union leadership or contractual commitments. Id. See Hamilton
Tool Co., 190 NLRB 571 (1971). For a discussion of Board precedent on the procedural
criterion, see notes 59-68 and accompanying text infra. Board precedent on the continuity of
representation criterion is discussed at notes 19-28 and accompanying text infra.
15. 232 N.L.R.B. No. 39, 97 L.R.R.M. 1495 (1977).
16. Id.
17. Id. at 1496. The Board has held previously that the subsequent ratification of a
local-local merger by a majority of the bargaining unit satisfies the procedural requirement.
See Ocean Systems, Inc. 223 N.L.R.B. 857 (1976); Kentucky Power Co., 213 N.L.R.B. 730
(1974); Safway Steel Scaffolds Co., 173 N.L.R.B. 311 (1968).
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merged local. ' 8
Jasper and McKesson are representative of recent Board rulings on AC
petitions. Since the composition of the Board panels and the facts in each
case differ, direct comparisons between the decisions are difficult. Never-
theless, when viewed in light of the prior law in this area, Jasper and Mc-
Kesson indicate that both the continuity of representation and the
procedural criteria may be easier to satisfy in cases of local-local consoli-
dations than in instances of independent-international affiliations. Fur-
thermore, should the Board adopt Member Penello's view, as stated in
Jasper that independent-international mergers raise a question concerning
representation, the AC procedure might no longer be viable in this type of
merger. Thus, it is important to explore the procedural and continuity cri-
teria set forth in existing AC decisions in order to determine the applicable
standards imposed in union merger cases.
I. WHEN DOES A MERGED UNION EXHIBIT CONTINUITY OF
REPRESENTATION?
The AC procedure is designed to effect a technical change in the identity
of the union representative without the necessity of a full-scale election. 19
More profound changes in the status of a bargaining representative raise a
representation question requiring a Board-sponsored certification elec-
tion.20 Therefore, in acting on an AC petition, the Board will evaluate the
degree of representational continuity afforded by the proposed merger in
order to determine whether the change in "status" raises a question con-
cerning representation. 2'
Traditionally, the Board has utilized lenient standards in making this
evaluation. This attitude is illustrated -in United States Gypsum Co. ,22 in
which two local units of the same international union voted to consolidate
and filed an AC petition with the Board. In granting the petition, the
Board found that the merged union had adequately demonstrated con-
tinuity of representation by producing evidence that the "day-to-day rela-
18. 97 L.R.R.M. at 1495-96. The successor local retained the same leadership, dues
structure and constitutional framework. Id.
19. See Hamilton Tool Co., 190 N.L.R.B. 571, 576 (1971)(Chairman Miller, concur-
ring).
20. See, e.g., Missouri Beef Packers, Inc., 175 N.L.R.B. 1100, 1101 (1969)(a question
concerning representation is raised when the certified local is a viable, functioning entity
opposing the AC); Hershey Chocolate Corp., 121 N.L.R.B. 901, 907-08 (1958)(an intra-
union schism resulting from conflict over policy which disrupts existing intraunion relation-
ships raises a question concerning representation).
21. See note 7 supra.
22. 164 N.L.R.B. 931 (1967).
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tionship" between the unit employees and the employer would remain
unchanged, the existing contract would be honored, and the same local-
international affiliation would continue.23 Likewise, in Woolworth Co. ,24
the Board granted the AC petition sought by a local which had consoli-
dated with another local of the same international. The merged local in
Woolworth demonstrated continuity by showing that it had maintained
the same functional leaders and the same procedures for contract propos-
als, negotiations, ratifications and grievance processing.25.
Although the standards in United States Gypsum and Woolworth were
applied to the merger of two local affiliates of the same international, the
Board has used similar standards to evaluate the degree of representa-
tional continuity when an independent union has sought to affiliate with
an international. In Emery Industries, Inc. ,26 for example, an independent
union filed an AC petition after merging with a large international. Since
the international union assured the independent in writing that the resul-
tant unit would remain autonomous, honor all contract commitments, and
retain its leaders and officers, the Board had no trouble finding representa-
tional continuity and granted the petition. 27 Similarly, in East Dayton Tool
& Die Co.,28 the Board granted an AC petition to a newly merged in-
dependent-international local when evidence showed that the officers
would be maintained and the existing contract honored. It is apparent that
when determining whether an AC petition should be given to a merged
local, the Board has used identical standards to evaluate continuity in both
independent-international union affiliations and local-local consolidations
of the same international union.
The majority of appellate courts reviewing Board decisions to grant AC
petitions29 have accepted the Board standards for the continuity of repre-
23. Id.
24. 194 N.L.R.B. 1208 (1972).
25. Id. at 1208-09. Compare Quemetco, Inc., 226 N.L.R.B. 1398, 1399 (1976)(the Board
held that the retention of union officers was not of "paramount importance," but only one of
many factors to be considered in determining continuity of representation).
26. 148 N.L.R.B. 51 (1964).
27. Id. at 52-53. The Board also noted that fact that only the employer opposed the
merger. Id.
28. 190 N.L.R.B. 577 (1971). In East Dayton the Board noted that the predecessor local
did not oppose the AC petition. Id. at 580.
29. The appellate courts are required to accept Board findings of fact if, on the record as
a whole, substantial evidence supports the finding. See Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB,
340 U.S. 474, 490-91 (1951).
Although the courts cannot pass directly on the propriety of an AC petition, the employer
can invoke their jurisdiction and indirectly obtain review of the petition by refusing to bar-
gain with the merged local after the AC petition is granted. This maneuver forces the union
to file a § 8(a)(5) unfair labor practice charge with the Board against the employer to obtain
1979]
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sentation criterion, regardless of whether the merger involves a local-local
consolidation 30 or an independent-international affiliation. 31 One court of
appeals, however, has rejected the Board's lenient application of these cri-
teria in cases involving mergers of independents with large internationals.
In United States Steel Corp. v. NLRB,32 the employer refused to bargain
after the formerly independent union representative became affiliated with
the United Steelworkers of America. The Board found a section 8(a)(5)
violation, but the Third Circuit refused to enforce the Board's bargaining
order.33 Since the employer's defense to the unfair labor practice charge
an order requiring the employer to recognize and bargain with the merged union. See 29
U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1976). The employer may raise as a defense, however, that it is no longer
under a duty to bargain with the union, because the merger has destroyed the continuity of
representation, thus presenting a question concerning representation that can be resolved
only through a Board-supervised certification election. See, e.g., NLRB v. Gissel Packing
Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1968). See generally F. BARTOSIC & R. HARTLEY, LABOR RELATIONS
LAW IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR 89-90 (1977). The employer can further defend by arguing
that it would be commiting an unfair labor practice by continuing to bargain with a union
that was no longer the certified representative of its unit employees. See Midwest Piping &
Supply Co., 63 N.L.R.B. 1060 (1945) (the employer commits a violation of § 8(a)(2) of the
Taft-Hartley Act if it fails to withdraw recognition when another union has raised a question
concerning representation).
The Board is unlikely, however, to reverse its finding of representational continuity in the
earlier AC proceeding. It is probable that the Board will find the employer guilty of the §
8(a)(5) unfair labor practice charge, and will issue a bargaining order accordingly. Assum-
ing the employer persists in its refusal to recognize the union, the Board will seek enforce-
ment of its order in the appropriate court of appeals. In the court of appeals, the employer
may reassert the same defenses in support of its refusal to bargain, and thereby effectively
invoke appellate review of the Board's finding of representational continuity. If the court
finds the Board's determination sound, it will enforce the order requiring the employer to
bargain with the merged local. But, if the court disagrees with the Board's evaluation, the
bargaining order will be denied enforcement. Compare Sun Oil Co. v. NLRB, 98 L.R.R.M.
2467 (3d Cir. 1978)(the employer successfully asserted that the merger raised a question
concerning representation) with Retail Clerks, Local 428 (Independent Drug Store Owners)
v. NLRB, 528 F.2d 1225 (9th Cir. 1975)(same defense unsuccessful; court enforced bargain-
ing order).
30. See, e.g., Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n v. NLRB (Montgomery Ward & Co), 373 F.2d
655, 657 (D.C. Cir. 1967). The court enforced the Board's finding that the employer had
committed an unfair labor practice by refusing to bargain with a local-local merged union.
Agreeing with Board's finding of representational continuity, the court held that the merger
did not invade the employees' right to select a bargaining representative and, therefore, did
not defeat the local's presumption of continuing majority status. Id.
31. See, e.g., Retail Clerks, Local 428 (Independent Drug Store Owners) v. NLRB, 528
F.2d 1225 (9th Cir. 1975)(representational continuity after an independent-international
merger depends on factual determinations which the Board makes initially and the court
follows if supported by substantial evidence; the bargaining order was enforced); NLRB v.
Bear Archery, 95 L.R.R.M. 3094 (6th Cir. 1977)(the Board's bargaining order was denied on
procedural grounds; representational continuity was not questioned).
32. 457 F.2d 660 (3d Cir. 1972).
33. Id. at 666.
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was that the merger had destroyed representational continuity, thereby ter-
minating its duty to bargain, the court reviewed the Board's application of
the continuity criterion.34 Although it found that the terms of the existing
contract would be honored and that the local leaders would remain un-
changed, the court concluded that the dilution in "the rights of the parties"
to the contract resulting from the affiliation between an independent with a
membership of 300 and an international having 1,120,000 members pre-
cluded a finding of representational continuity. 3" Critical to the court's
conclusion was the merged local's subjugation to the international union's
constitution. 36 Since the new constitution required the international presi-
dent's approval before a strike could be called and remission to the inter-
national of dues acquired by the employer pursuant to a check-off
provision, the court concluded that the rights of unit members were
changed significantly. 37 Most importantly, however, the court saw the
transfer of the power to negotiate the contract, handle grievances, and fix
dues as a clear indication of a "change in the fulcrum of union control and
representation. '38
Since United States Steel, the Third Circuit has refused to enforce Board
bargaining orders in two similar cases, NLRB v. Bernard Gloekler North
East Co.39 and Sun Oil Co. v. NLRB. 4° Both of these cases involved em-
ployer refusals to bargain after certified independent unions merged with
international unions and were granted amendment certifications. In Ber-
nard Gloekler, the court found that the Board's application of the con-
tinuity criterion in cases involving independent-international mergers
allowed "powerful international unions to be substituted for independent
locals while contracts are in force," in direct contravention of the Board's
own contract bar rule.4 ' Furthermore, in Sun Oil, the court specifically
held that since it imposes a new constitution on the unit members, the
merger of an independent with an international union changes the bar-
gaining agent of the employees.42 Under the Third Circuit's view, then, an
34. Id. at 663-64.
35. Id. at 664.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. This transfer of power from officials whose primary interests were those of the
300 independent members to officers representing the overall interests of the many members
of the international was a clear indication of a major change in the independent's status. Id.
39. 540 F.2d 197 (3d Cir. 1976).
40. 576 F.2d 553 (3d Cir. 1978).
41. 540 F.2d at 203. See note 51 infra.
42. 576 F.2d at 558. The court concluded:
We hold that when a local independent labor union affiliates with and becomes a
local unit of an international union and transfers control over the rights of its
19791
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independent-international merger per se terminates the employer's duty to
continue recognition of a previously certified union. As of this writing, no
other circuit court of appeals has adopted this reasoning,43 but it was re-
cently embraced by Board Member Penello in Jasper Seating Co. 44
In Jasper, Member Penello was the only member of the full Board who
voted to dismiss the AC petition because the merged union failed to show
representational continuity.45 Following the Third Circuit's rationale,
Member Penello concluded that the merger had resulted in a substantial
change in the identity of the bargaining representative because a new con-
stitution had been imposed on the local.46 Since the union offered proof
that the officers would remain unchanged and contractual commitments
would be honored, evidence which has traditionally satisfied the Board's
continuity inquiry; no other member questioned the representational con-
tinuity of the merged local.47 Nevertheless, Member Penello's stance in
Jasper is significant because it demonstrates that the Third Circuit's posi-
tion henceforth will be advocated in AC proceedings before the Board.
Accordingly, employer opposition to AC petitions may be more frequently
advanced on this ground.48
members to the international whose constitution and by laws make substantial
changes in the rights of employees to the contract, affects their obligations to man-
agement and links their concerns with thousands of other members of the interna-
tional throughout the county, a change is effected in the bargaining agent of such
employees.
Id.
43. See, e.g., NLRB v. Bear Archery, 95 L.R.R.M. 3094 (6th Cir. 1977)(the Board's
bargaining order was denied enforcement because the court found the procedures used to
ascertain majority approval were inadequate; representational continuity was not question-
ed; the issues raised in Bernard Gloeker were not addressed). See also notes 30 & 31 supra.
44. 231 N.L.R.B. 1025, 1027 (1977)(Member Penello, concurring).
45. Id. See notes I 1-13 and accompanying text supra.
46. Id. at 1027-28. Despite "surface similarities" between the merged local and the
independent, Member Penello found that the affiliation resulted in a "clear change in the
identity of the employees' bargaining representative." Id. at 1028.
47. See id. at 1025-26. The plurality opinion of Members Walther and Jenkins con-
cluded: "[Tihere has been no essential change in the identity of bargaining representative
(at least within the meaning of past Board precedents)." Id. (parenthetical in original). The
plurality did not cite the precedents to which it referred. Chairman Fanning and Member
Murphy, in dissent, concluded that the purpose of the affiliation vote is to determine if the
independent members want assistance from the international in conducting their affairs with
the employer, not to select a new bargaining agent. Id. at 1028. (Chairman Fanning and
Member Murphy, dissenting).
48. Section 10(e) of the of the Taft-Hartley Act states in pertinent part that "no objec-
tion that has not been urged before the Board, its member, agent, or agency, shall be consid-
ered by the court, [i.e., the appropriate court of appeals] unless the failure or neglect to urge




Should Member Penello's view of the continuity criterion be adopted by
a Board majority, the ramifications undoubtedly will be great. The pri-
mary benefit of the AC procedure is to effect nominal changes in the status
of the bargaining agent without the necessity of a new Board-sponsored
election. 49 Accordingly, the AC procedure is available at any time during
the union-employer relationship, and it is unaffected by any of the bars to
certification elections imposed by either the Taft-Hartley Act 50 or Board
rules. 5' But if, as under the Penello-Third Circuit view, the merger of a
certified independent union with an international were automatically to
raise a question concerning representation, the AC procedure would be-
come an inappropriate method to certify such a change in status. Instead,
the change in status could be effected only through a Board-conducted
certification election, which can take place only when none of the bars to a
certification election are in force.52 Furthermore, since the merger would
49. See note 6 supra.
50. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(3) (1976). This section bars a certification election in any bar-
gaining unit within the 12 month period after a valid election has been held. This prohibi-
tion is referred to as the statutory election bar.
51. In an effort to accommodate the goals of industrial stability and employee free
choice, the Board has devised, in addition to the statutory election bar, three other bars
prohibiting certification elections. The certification bar prevents the filing of certification
petitions within one year from the date of a union's certification by the Board. See Centr-0-
Cast & Eng'r Co., 100 N.L.R.B. 1507, 1508 (1952). Similarly, the Board has developed a
lawful voluntary recognition bar which affords a reasonable period of time for the employer
and union to reach a contract following voluntary recognition and bars any other unions
from filing a petition during this period. See Keller Plastics E., Inc., 157 N.L.R.B. 583, 587
(1966). Also, a collective bargaining contract between the certified union and the employer
generally bars an election in the bargaining unit covered by the contract for a period of three
years, or the term of the contract, whichever is shorter. See General Cable Corp., 139
N.L.R.B. 1123, 1125 (1962). The contract will qualify as a bar if it: (1) has a definite dura-
tion; (2) is in writing and has been executed by all parties; (3) applies to the employees cited
in the election petition; (4) covers an appropriate unit; (5) contains substantial terms and
conditions of employment; (6) does not contain a union security clause which is facially
invalid or has been found by the Board to be invalid; and (7) does not racially discriminate
among employees. See Jonathan H. Swisher & Son, Inc., 209 N.L.R.B. 68, 69 (1974); Appa-
lachian Shale Prod. Co., 121 N.L.R.B. 1160, 1161-64 (1958). See also F. BARTOSIC & R.
HARTLEY, supra note 29, at 79.
52. See F. BARTOSIC & R. HARTLEY, supra note 29, at 78-80; notes 50 & 51 supra. A
30-day "open period" exists during which certification petitions may be filed during the term
of an existing contract, beginning 90 days and ending 60 days before the expiration date of
the contract. See Leonard Wholesale Meats, Inc., 136 N.L.R.B. 1000, 1001 (1962). Another
"open period" occurs after the contract has been in effect for three years or after it has
expired and no other contract has been executed. See General Cable Corp., 139 N.L.R.B.
1123, 1125 (1962). Similarly, a certification petition filed within the 60 days prior to the
expiration of the statutory election bar will be processed, but the election will not occur until
the 12 month period has passed. See Vickers, Inc., 124 N.L.R.B. 1051, 1052 (1959). In
contrast, petitions filed at any time within the 12 month period following Board certification
of a union will not be processed; such filings may occur only after the 12 month period has
19791
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relieve the employer of its duty to bargain with the merged-incumbent
union,5 3 a merged union's only recourse to regain recognitional status dur-
ing periods when certification elections are barred would be immediate
disaffilation with the international. Therefore, should the Third Circuit's
view be adopted by the Board majority, the usefulness of the AC proce-
dure to effect an independent-international union merger will be elimi-
nated and the mergers themselves will be restricted to open periods when
Board-supervised certification elections are permitted.
It is not clear whether the Third Circuit would, if given the occasion,
extend its reasoning to cases of local-local consolidations. Although
merged locals retain the same constitution, substantial changes in collec-
tive bargaining procedures and grievance processing, which are not unlike
the changes imposed by international constitutions on independent unions,
do occur.54 Arguably, the Penello-Third Circuit view, eventually could
serve as a basis for finding a lack of representational continuity in mergers
involving consolidated locals.
The position of the Board majority on the continuity of representation
criterion with its emphasis on retention of leadership and contract commit-
ment 55 is, however, the better view for two reasons. First, by requiring
maintenance of existing contractual duties and rights, the position assures
continued industrial stability even when the merger occurs in the middle of
a contract term. 56 By making the maintenance of an existing contract a
prerequisite to granting an AC petition, the Board ensures that a change in
union status will not affect the existing employer-union contract relation-
passed. See Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96, 104 (1954). If the union has been voluntarily
recognized, no petition may be filed until the parties have had a reasonable period of time to
negotiate a contract. See Brennan's Cadillac, Inc., 231 N.L.R.B. 225, 226-27 (1977)(reason-
able time was three months and eight bargaining sessions).
53. See notes 32-41 and accompanying text supra.
54. See, e.g., Newspapers, Inc., 210 N.L.R.B. 8 (1974), enforced, 515 F.2d 334 (5th Cir.
1975)(merger sanctioned between two locals located over 200 miles apart); F. W. Woolworth
Co., 194 N.L.R.B. 1208 (1972) (AC petition granted after consolidation of local having 162
members with local having 2100 members). Although AC petitions were granted in both of
these cases, the consolidation did alter member rights. The distance union members must
travel to attend meetings in Newspapers limited member participation in the decision-mak-
ing of union leaders. Likewise, the smaller proportionate voice the union members in Wool-
worth had after the merger substantially reduced individual input in collective bargaining
proposals and shifted the forces of power to leaders concerned with the interests of a great
many as opposed to a few. See note 38 and accompanying text supra.
55. See notes 26-28 and accompanying text supra.
56. This policy of promoting stability during contracts is the principal reason for the
Board's contract bar rule prohibiting certification during the term of a contract. See Gen-
eral Cable Corp., 139 N.L.R.B. 1123, 1125 (1962); note 51 supra. See also Brooks v. NLRB,
348 U.S. 96, 103 (1954) (underlying purpose of the Taft-Hartley Act is industrial peace).
[Vol. 28:587
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ship. Secondly, retaining a union's leadership after the merger will main-
tain the day to day channels of communication between the employer and
the union as they existed before the merger. Since the merger of a certified
bargaining representative with another union has the potential to upset the
stability in labor relations between a union and employer promoted by an
existing contract, the retention of established labor-management channels
of communication will minimize any disruption.57
Neither of these factors predominate. Rather, both are used as methods
of protecting industrial stability from the potentially disruptive effect of a
merger. Therefore, if the Board majority continues to find the continuity
criterion satisfied when the merged union filing the AC petition can show
retention of the local leadership and a commitment to honor the existing
contract, the occurrence of union mergers will, in all likelihood, continue
to increase. 58 International unions will continue to evaluate the structural
necessity of reorganization whenever the need arises, rather than waiting
until periods when certification elections can be held. Likewise, independ-
ent unions can attain the benefits of affiliation with an international with-
out fear of the loss of certified status. In sum, the majority's view allows a
union to change its status through a merger during periods when certifica-
tion elections cannot be held and simultaneously assures industrial stabil-
ity by requiring proof that the union-employer relationship is maintained.
II. THE PROCEDURAL INQUIRY - WHEN DOES THE RESULT OF A
MERGER APPROVAL ELECTION REFLECT MAJORITY OPINION?
The second inquiry made by the Board after an AC petition is filed cen-
ters on whether the results obtained in the merger approval election mirror
the majority opinion. In this determination, the employees' freedom of
choice in selecting the bargaining representative, rather than industrial sta-
bility, is the underlying policy consideration.5 9
A. The "'Formal Steps" Necessaryfor an Approval Election
The Board requires the approval election to reflect certain procedures
before considering an AC petition submitted in connection with either an
independent-international affiliation or a local-local consolidation. Al-
though the Board has never clearly indicated what it perceives to be the
minimum safeguards required, it has, however, frequently noted with ap-
57. See North Elec. Co., 165 N.L.R.B. 942 (1967).
58. See notes I & 3 and accompanying text supra.
59. See North Elec. Co., 165 N.L.R.B. 942, 943 (1967).
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proval a number of procedures. In North Electric Co. 60 and Emery Indus-
tries, Inc.,6 1 the Board indicated that a secret ballot to approve
independent-international mergers, accompanied by proof that all employ-
ees eligible to vote had ample notice of the time and place of the election
were necessary procedural standards.62 Similarly, in Hamilton Tool Co. 
63
the Board granted the petition when the union used secret ballots, pro-
vided ample notice of the vote to the employees, and afforded those voting
in the election the opportunity to discuss and ask questions about the pro-
posed merger.64
There is some evidence, however, that less stringent procedural stand-
ards are imposed in elections approving consolidations of locals of the
same international union.65 For example, in Kentucky Power Co. ,66 the
Board granted an AC petition even though the approval vote, taken after
the actual consolidation, was not conducted with secret ballots. Addition-
ally, the grant of the AC petitions in Kentucky Power and Sa/way Steel
Scaffolds Co.67 indicates that the Board does not require that employees
voting to approve local-local consolidations be given the opportunity to
discuss and question the merger before it occurs. 68 Arguably, the differ-
ences in minimum procedural standards required in the two types of union
mergers reflect the amount of actual change involved in each of the two
situations. Seemingly in evaluating the adequacy of the approval vote in a
particular AC proceeding, the Board has placed the facts of the case on a
mythical spectrum reflecting the degree of change in the certified represen-
tative. At one end of the spectrum, the degree of change is minimal. This
end is characterized by mergers involving the consolidation of locals of the
same international, when officers, constitutional rights and employer-
60. Id. at 942.
61. 148 N.L.R.B. 51 (1964).
62. North Elec. Co., 165 N.L.R.B. at 942-43; Emery Ind., Inc., 148 N.L.R.B. at 52.
63. 190 N.L.R.B. 571 (1971).
64. Id. at 574.
65. See Viking Metal Indus., NLRB Advice Mem., 93 L.R.R.M. 1333, 1334
(1976)(lower standard applied in evaluating the procedural criterion in local-local merger
elections than in those held by independent unions seeking to affiliate with international
unions). See also Kentucky Power Co., 213 N.L.R.B. 730, 732 (1974)(show of hands vote
rather than a secret ballot is not so irregular as to negate the validity of the members' expres-
sion). But see Underwriters Adjusting Co., 227 N.L.R.B. 453, 454 (1976)(AC petition denied
because the members of one of the locals were not given the opportunity to vote in the
approval election.)
66. 213 N.L.R.B. 730 (1974).
67. 173 N.L.R.B. 311 (1968).
68. In both cases, an after-the-fact merger ratification vote was sufficient to show mem-
bership approval. Kentucky Power Co., 213 N.L.R.B. at 732; Safway Steel Scaffolds Co.,
173 N.L.R.B. at 312.
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union relations remain unchanged. Because little change is involved, the
need to protect employee free choice is less acute; consequently, relatively
few procedural requirements are imposed. At the other end of the spec-
trum, the change in bargaining agent is more severe, and the status of the
merged union borders on the threshold of presenting a question concern-
ing representation. Such a situation arises when independent and interna-
tional unions merge necessitating procedural requirements similar to those
imposed in Board-supervised elections. By employing this spectrum anal-
ysis, the Board allows the AC procedure to be "a quite reasonable accom-
modation between the statute's sometimes inconsistent purposes of
industrial stability and freedom of choice."
69
Such an abstract analysis, however, is an inadequate guide for the union
contemplating a merger. Since the Board has not explicitly defined proce-
dural standards for the two types of union mergers, it must make an ad hoc
procedural inquiry in each AC determination. It may be prudent for a
union contemplating a merger to invoke the full panoply of Board-ap-
proved formal steps.70
This approach was taken by the union in Jasper Seating Co. ,7' but the
AC was nevertheless denied.72 Two members of the majority found the
procedures used in the approval election insufficient and imposed a further
requirement: all unit employees, not just union members, must be given
an opportunity to state their views and vote on the proposed merger.
73
B. Must All Unit Employees Be Permitted to Vote in Merger Approval
Elections?
In North Electric Co, 74 Member Jenkins first tried to persuade the Board
majority that approval by all unit employees was a prerequisite to granting
an AC petition.75 Finding the selection of the bargaining agent basic to
the collective bargaining process, he, together with Member Zagoria, rea-
69. Hamilton Tool Co., 190 N.L.R.B. 571, 576 (1971)(Chairman Miller, concurring).
70. A synthesis of past Board decisions indicates that the following list of formal steps
has traditionally satisfied minimum procedural requirements: (1) at least one meeting is
held to answer questions and openly discuss the pros and cons of the proposed merger, see
Hamilton Tool Co., 190 N.L.R.B. 571, 574 (1971); (2) advance notice of the meeting is given
to all unit employees, see North Elec. Co., 165 N.L.R.B. 942-43 (1967); (3) notice of the time
and place of the approval election is given to all unit employees, see Emery Indus., Inc., 148
N.L.R.B. 51, 51-52 (1964); and (4) the election, by secret ballot, is held before the affiliation
or consolidation occurs, see Hamilton Tool Co., 190 N.L.R.B. 571, 574-75 (1971).
71. 231 N.L.R.B. 1025 (1977).
72. Id. at 1026.
73. Id. at 1025-26 (opinion of Members Jenkins and Walther).
74. 165 N.L.R.B. 942 (1967).
75. Id. at 943 (Members Jenkins and Zagoria, dissenting).
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soned that any change in the agent's designation required the approval of
all unit members. 76 The majority, however, found that limiting voting to
only union members satisfied the procedural inquiry, and proceeded to
grant the AC petition.77
Likewise, in Hamilton Tool Co. ,78 the majority of the full Board again
rejected Member Jenkins' view and granted an AC petition. The majority
classified the independent union's affiliation with an international as an
"internal union matter" and thus required only the approval of union
members.79 Similarly, in East Dayton Tool & Die Co. ,80 the Board major-
ity adhered to the position that merger approval elections concerned inter-
nal union affairs and found a members-only voting procedure sufficient. 8'
Member Jenkins persisted in his view 82 that unanimous unit approval is
necessary to grant the petition and gained additional support from Mem-
ber Walther in Jasper Seating Co.83 Because Member Penello failed to find
representational continuity in Jasper,84 the AC petition was dismissed. 85
Since Member Penello never reached the voting issue and because Chair-
man Fanning and Member Murphy continued to regard that issue as an
internal union affair, the Board in Jasper divided evenly over the issue of
who must be allowed to vote. Given the recent change in the Board's com-
position, however, a return to the previously held majority position is pos-
sible. Member Walther has been replaced by Member Truesdale and, as
of this writing, Truesdale has participated in only one AC decision, New
76. Id. at 944 (Members Jenkins and Zagoria, dissenting). They stated that "a cardinal
prerequisite to any change in designation of the bargaining representative is that all employ-
ees in the bargaining unit be afforded the opportunity to participate in such selection." Id.
at 944 (emphasis in the original).
77. Id. at 942-43. The majority noted that all non-union members had been notified of
the proposed election and had been given ample time and the opportunity to become mem-
bers before the vote occurred.
78. 190 N.L.R.B. 571 (1971).
79. Id. at 574.
80. 190 N.L.R.B. 577 (1971). In both Hamilton Tool and Dayton Tool, however, the
majority was careful to note that the outcome of the election would not have been affected if
all unit employees had been allowed to vote. Id. at 580. Hamilton Tool & Die Co., 190
N.L.R.B. at 574.
81. East Dayton Tool & Dye Co., 190 N.L.R.B. at 580.
82. See Good Hope Indus., Inc., 230 N.L.R.B. 1132, (1977)(Jenkins approved the AC
petition noting that the record did not indicate any unit employee was denied the right to
vote); Hamilton Tool Co., 190 N.L.R.B. at 576 (Member Jenkins, dissenting); East Dayton
Tool & Die Co., 190 N.L.R.B. at 580 (Member Jenkins, dissenting).
83. 231 N.L.R.B. 1025 (1977).
84. Id. at 1027-28 (Member Penello, concurring). See notes 45-47 and accompanying
text supra.
85. 231 N.L.R.B. at 1026.
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Orleans Public Service, Inc. 86 In that case, an AC petition was granted
when an independent merged with an international, but the issue of non-
union member voting was not raised. 87 Although Member Jenkins was on
the Board panel, the approval of the election met with no challenge since
all unit employees had been given an opportunity to vote.88 Similarly, the
continuity of representation inquiry met with no resistance, presumably
because Member Penello was not on the Board panel. If Member Penello
had participated, however, he would probably have found continuity lack-
ing despite the inclusion of a successor clause 89 in the existing contract
between the independent union and employer. Although Member
Penello's vote alone will not foreclose an AC petition, his vote, coupled
with the votes of any two other members denying the petition on procedu-
ral grounds, can determine its fate. 90 Therefore, if Member Penello should
adopt the Jenkins view, AC petitions filed to reflect independent-interna-
tional affiliations will likely meet the same fate as Jasper if the union ex-
cludes nonmember unit employees from voting in the approval election
and if the case is reviewed by either the full Board or a panel containing
any two of Members Truesdale, Penello and Jenkins. Additionally, since
Member Penello has not indicated his position on the "all unit employee"
vote requirement, there is a possibility that this standard could be imposed
on future local-local consolidations should he agree with Member Jenkins'
reasoning. A prudent union lawyer would be well advised to urge that a
union contemplating a merger allow all unit employees the opportunity to
vote in the approval election.
Although both the "all unit employee" vote and "internal union affair"
rationales have merit, the ultimate resolution of the controversy depends
upon the Board's statutory authority to impose procedural requirements
on these union elections. Implicit in the Taft-Hartley91 and the Labor-
Management Reporting and Disclosure (Landrum-Griffin) 92 Acts is the
86. 237 N.L.R.B. No. 134, 99 L.R.R.M. 1032 (1978).
87. Id. at 1033-34.
88. Id. at 1033 n.5.
89. The existing contract stated "This agreement and all of its terms and conditions
shall insure to the benefit of and be binding upon the successor and assigns of the respective
parties." Id. at 1033 n.8.
90. See notes 83-85 and accompanying text supra. The Board is empowered under sec-
tion 3(b) of the Taft-Hartley Act to delegate decisionmaking to panels of three members. 29
U.S.C. § 153(b) (1976). While these three member panels decide routine cases, those cases
deemed particularly important by Board members will be heard by the full Board. See F.
BARTOSIC & R. HARTLEY, supra note 29, at 16. It is likely that any controversial merger
cases, such as Jasper, will be heard by the full Board.
91. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141 to 67, 171 to 97 (1976).
92. 29 U.S.C. §§ 401 to 531 (1976).
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policy that a labor union should have the right to conduct its internal af-
fairs without interference. 93 Although the Supreme Court has indicated
that the Board lacks statutory authority to interfere with internal union
matters in most instances, it has recognized that the Board has a duty to
intervene when union conduct threatens an overriding federal labor pol-
icy.94 Therefore, the Board's power to impose any procedural requirements
on union-conducted merger approval elections must be based on the need
to protect an overriding federal labor policy.
A union merger usually modifies, to varying degrees, the nature of the
union-employer and union-employee relationship. 95 Accordingly, before
it grants an AC petition, the Board is justified in conducting a procedural
inquiry to ensure that the employees' right to be represented by a bargain-
ing agent of their choice is maintained. The statutory authority for this
interference in internal union affairs is section 7 of the Taft-Hartley Act,
which embodies the federal labor policy guaranteeing employees the right
to bargain collectively "through representatives of their own choosing. '96
93. This policy was recognized and discussed by the Supreme Court in three decisions
dealing with union discipline. See NLRB v. Boeing Co., 412 U.S. 67 (1973); Scofield v.
NLRB, 394 U.S. 423 (1969); NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers, 338 U.S. 175 (1967); note 94 infra. In
NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers, 338 U.S. 175 (1967), the Court found that a union had not violated
section 8(b)(l)(A) of the Taft-Hartley Act (29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(l)(A) (1976)) when it fined its
members for crossing an authorized lawful picket line. In the legislative history of the Act,
the Court found numerous assurances by the sponsors of § 8(b)(1)(A) that the section was
not meant to regulate union affairs, and the Court concluded that the Board's authority to
regulate internal affairs under the Taft-Hartley Act was limited to barring the enforcement
of an internal union regulation which used membership status to affect employment status.
388 U.S. at 195. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(2) (1976).
One reason advanced for this policy of federal noninterference in union affairs at the time
of enactment was that unions are voluntary associations, similar to religious and fraternal
organizations, that have no easily definable standards or rules governing internal procedure
that the courts can use in deciding disputes. See Summers, Legal Limitations on Union Disci-
pline, 64 HARV. L. REV. 1049, 1051 (1951). In accord with this policy of federal noninterfer-
ence, the legislative history of the Taft-Hartley Act reveals that the proponents of the closed
shop prohibition provision, (29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(2) (1976)) stressed that the clause, if enacted,
would be the only one in the Act where the union's status as an independent voluntary
organization would be threatened. See Epstein, The Expanding Coverage of Section 301 of
the Labor-Management Relation Act, 26 LAB. L.J. 439, 446 (1975).
94. In Scofield v. NLRB, 394 U.S. 423, (1969), the Court stated that the Board had no
statutory authority to interfere in internal affairs unless it is clear that "the rule invades or
frustrates an overriding policy of the labor laws." Id. at 429. Likewise, in NLRB v. Boeing
Co., 412 U.S. 67 (1973), the Court found the Board's statutory power did not allow it to
determine the "reasonableness" of union discipline unless the exercise of the discipline
thwarts a policy of the Taft-Hartley Act. Id. at 74-75. These decisions imply that the
Board's power to interfere in any internal union matter must be based on a need to protect
another overriding labor policy.
95. See text accompanying notes 68-69 supra.
96. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976).
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This right, however, is not limited to the protection of union member
rights. Rather, the right to be represented by a freely chosen bargaining
agent extends to all unit members. 97 An argument can thus be made that
Member Jenkins' position requiring that all unit employees be given the
opportunity to vote in approval elections is consonant with, and carefully
tailored to protect, the unit employees' section 7 rights. These are the very
rights that provide the basis for the Board's imposition upon internal
union affairs.
III. CONCLUSION
Union mergers are becoming more and more prevalent as both interna-
tional and independent unions attempt to reconcile their structural
frameworks with membership needs. Although the AC procedure remains
a viable tool for unions to retain certified bargaining representative status
after merger, the varying Board members' views of both the continuity of
representation and procedural requirements has created some confusion.
Until these criteria are more firmly established, the prudent union counsel
must urge a client to utilize the strictest safeguards possible in connection
with any merger. From the continuity standpoint, the merged union
should be prepared to show that its local leaders have been retained, that
the day to day relationship with the employer remains intact, and that all
existing contract obligations will be honored. Such a showing should be
sufficient to satisfy the continuity criterion, even in cases of independent-
international affiliations, provided Member Penello's view remains a mi-
nority position on the Board and the appropriate court of appeals accepts
the Board's continuity criterion. Similarly, the union should employ the
full range of formal, Board-sanctioned procedural steps prior to the
merger. These would include holding meetings for employees to discuss
the proposed merger, taking the merger approval vote by secret ballot, and
giving adequate notice to employees of all meetings. Furthermore, be-
cause the AC procedure must not abridge the right of all employees in the
bargaining unit to choose their representative, all unit employees should
be permitted to vote in the merger approval election.
Likewise, the prudent management counsel should advise the employer
to withdraw recognition of the merged union if it has a reasonable doubt
that the union has satisfied both the procedural and continuity of represen-
tation criteria. Such a refusal to bargain will force the union to file an
unfair labor practice charge, thus enabling the employer to adjudicate the
97. Id.
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propriety of the amendment certification in the appropriate court of ap-
peals.
When properly utilized, the AC procedure enables unions to restructure
without offending either the employees' right to choose their bargaining
agent or the need for industrial stability during contract terms.
Linda Carlisle
